9.3: Ethical Realism

In the next chapter we will be looking at normative ethical theories. We will start with two standard theories of right action: Kantian respect for persons and Utilitarianism. You will recall that realist ethical theories take there to be ethical truths and take their truth to be based on something other than somebody’s will or say so. What, then, could ground the truth of such theories? Both Utilitarianism and respect-for-persons theories can be understood as grounded in views about what has value, or what is good objectively. Utilitarianism is based on the idea that happiness is good. Of course we think happiness is good. But why should we think that happiness is objectively good, not just good to us? The Humean subjectivist might complain that we can’t observe the goodness of happiness in any sort of objective way. It can’t be seen under a microscope or measured with a happiness meter. Respect-for-persons theory is based on the idea that people have intrinsic moral worth, or, as Kant puts it, dignity. But likewise, we have no scientifically credible dignity detector.

Under the sway of Empiricism, many thoughtful people have doubted that there is any objective value that could ground substantive normative moral theories like Utilitarianism or respect for persons. In this text we have encountered not just Hume, but the broad empiricist movement of Logical Positivism. There remain quite a few subjectivists among prominent contemporary philosophers. And we’ve also seen a number of intermediate views between subjectivism and realism (still rejecting conventionalism) developed in recent years. Too keep things simple, we have restricted our attention to more robust forms of subjectivism and we will do the same for realism.

It seems that we lack scientific evidence for objective value. But while we are appealing to science as the gold standard of epistemic respectability, we should note that many of the most fundamental concepts in science refer to basic forces that are not themselves directly observable. Physicists tell us that the protons and neutrons in the nucleus of an atom hold together thanks to a nuclear force, yet no one has directly observed this force. What scientists do observe are the effects of the force. For instance, we can observe the effects of the tremendous amounts of energy released when the force binding protons and neutrons together is overcome in a nuclear fission reaction. Our reason for believing in this nuclear force is that it provides the best explanation for many of the things we do experience. So, the fact that goodness itself is not empirically observable doesn’t make it any less respectable as a theoretical posit than the fundamental forces of physics.

Part of our experience is moral. We feel indignation when we are cheated. We feel warm moral approval at acts of generosity and compassion. Perhaps the best explanation for this aspect of our experience is that we have a moral sense, a recognition of the goodness of some things and the badness of others. Philosophers speak of moral intuitions in reference to this sense of the goodness or badness of things. And ethicists routinely appeal to moral intuitions as a kind of evidence that can weigh in favor of or against an ethical theory. Like the evidence of the senses, our moral intuitions can get things wrong. Moral intuitions can even be badly distorted due to personal or cultural biases of one sort or another. Sometimes theoretical insights reveal this. We are always looking for ways to make the evidence cohere with our theories. This is how we make sense of things. But we have assorted options in doing so. When the evidence of our moral intuitions conflicts with broader ethical theory, sometimes we question the evidence and sometimes we question the theory. Following our discussion of Kuhn in the philosophy of science chapter, it should be clear that things are not so different in science.

Questions about how we can know what is good or what is right are questions for moral epistemology. We won’t be directly concerned with these as we examine Utilitarianism and the ethics of respect for persons. But the suggestion here is that the justification for fundamental ethical principles will be a kind of inference to the best explanation. We have strong grounds for accepting a general normative ethical view if that view explains the preponderance of our assorted ethical intuitions. We might also hope the best normative ethical view will serve as an effective corrective to our occasional wayward moral intuition.

The aim of this chapter has been to prepare us for an inquiry into normative ethical theory. It should now be clear why taking ethical inquiry seriously requires disabusing ourselves of the popular attraction of conventionalist theories like Moral Relativism and DCT. Subjectivism remains a contender as a meta-ethical position, but not an obstacle to inquiry in normative ethics. We can now proceed to inquire and reason about normative ethical principles. Subjectivists can interpret this activity as they see fit. We will take up arguments and objections as usual and try to see where they lead.