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5.4: Tolerance in a Global Society (Noah Levin)

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    29 Tolerance in a Global Society
    Noah Levin39

    It goes without saying (but I’ll say it anyway) that no two people are the same. More importantly, no two people have identical belief systems and worldviews. We encounter views different than our own constantly: ones we don’t hold but will not object to, ones we feel indifferent about, and ones we disagree with. The first two categories may or may not elicit a response from us, and what protest does come from us is usually not negative. For example, I may believe the sunrise is more beautiful over the ocean, while you might believe it is more beautiful over a mountain. I disagree with you, but I make no objections to your belief. Or, since coconut is utterly disgusting, I would be completely indifferent as to whether you believe that coconut cream pie is better than coconut macaroons (and be very opposed to any claim that coconut tastes better than chocolate). Being confronted with beliefs we disagree with can put us on edge or even anger us. For example, if you were to say that blind nationalism from a nation’s citizens is necessary for any modern state to succeed, I would strongly object. In fact, I maintain that such a belief is not only irrational to hold, it is also very dangerous. But should you still be allowed to hold it and attempt to convince others to join you in your belief? I argue that we ought to tolerate all beliefs, including dangerous ones, but this toleration doesn’t mean that we must accept all beliefs and we still can, and should, voice our disagreements. We do not, however, have to permit any and all actions that come from such beliefs, especially if they are dangerous or harmful.

    It is very hard for me to understand any beliefs themselves as being dangerous. Despite my earlier claims (since it is easy to fall under the trap of calling beliefs one thing or another), it is hard to place any moral value on a belief itself. It is even hard to label a belief “right” or “wrong,” but they are easily labeled rational or irrational, supported or unsupported, and in accordance or discordance with observations. These are all technical terms, but beliefs are interesting in that we can believe anything we wish to, even irrational (that the Earth is flat) or logically impossible concepts (that I am a married bachelor). However, actions associated with these beliefs can certainly be dangerous, and any perceived concerns over beliefs themselves are actually due to their likelihood to lead to harm. Let me provide two examples, both of which occur today, and both of which are almost universally condemned: female genital mutilation and honor killings of family members. I choose these because they exist both as parts of certain religious beliefs and as secular notions. Thus, the motivations for such a belief can come from many angles and have multiple avenues of support. First, let’s separate these beliefs and actions that follow from them. The actions themselves, mutilating a young girl’s genitals that is both physically and emotionally scarring for life, and killing a relative to maintain family honor (often a young woman that has had relations outside of the culture), are utterly and completely harmful and wrong. While I can understand (but not support) the reasons some want to take these actions, their beliefs are likely to be seen as contradictory, irrational, and harmful even by their own cultural standards. There is no way that these actions should be tolerated in a modern liberal society, but should we tolerate others holding the belief they are right?

    Believing that girls ought to have their genitals mutilated or that relatives ought to be honor killed is not a proper belief to hold and I am certain I could craft a convincing argument against them from within any belief system that purports to supports them. Even so, despite overwhelming reasons and evidence, some still believe that these are the correct beliefs to hold. Merely having a belief, if it is never expressed or has any impact, is a non-issue. We can think up all sorts of things in our heads, but if they don’t connect to the outside world, they are irrelevant for others, and the notion of any type of “thought police” is problematic. Any beliefs can make their way out of our private monologues and into the world in four important ways: we can express them, we can act upon them, we can encourage others to do them, or we can support others that perform these actions.

    What we do with these problematic beliefs is the focus of my analysis. Expressing beliefs that lead to non-dangerous or non-harmful actions should never be a problem, and neither should it be a problem to take those actions, support them, or encourage others to take them. If there are any reasons to ever restrict actions associated with a particular belief, the reason to do so will be because those actions are, in some way, harmful, and not because we object to the belief itself. Please note that regardless of one’s preferred moral system, my arguments should still hold strength. I am not concerning myself with what is morally right, but with what we – as a society – are justified in controlling. While we must then permit people to hold any beliefs, can we be justified in restricting people from expressing those beliefs or supporting, encouraging, or taking harmful actions associated with their beliefs? For particular beliefs (like those supporting female genital mutilation or honor killings) where the associated actions are widely considered wrong and harmful, we do not have to tolerate people taking those actions, but we ought to tolerate people expressing those beliefs, their supporting others that do them, and we even ought to tolerate people encouraging others to take such actions unless that encouragement will play (or played) an integral and necessary role in the subsequent harm. In legal doctrine I am espousing here is known as “clear and present danger” which means we can only prevent people from expressing themselves if it is nearly certain to lead to a crime. This discussion, however, brings us a bit too far from the topic we are focusing on: how we should tolerate beliefs other than our own.

    Not tolerating certain actions or the encouragement of those actions (if this encouragement will be or was integral in the performance of the act) means that are justified in treating these actions as morally wrong and, where relevant, criminal. We can punish people and prevent them from expressing themselves when certain conditions are met. This should not be particularly radical: we prevent and punish people for taking dangerous and harmful actions. My claims that we ought to tolerate anything short of this, however, is not as obvious.

    When we tolerate something, we often see the value in someone being allowed to do whatever we are tolerating. We don’t necessarily agree with it, but we appreciate how we ought to let someone else do it. We “put up with” things all the time and putting up with something does not seem to mean the same thing as toleration. Putting up with something implies that we really want whatever it is to end and see no value in it continuing. For example, people put up with rude customers or clients all the time, as well as crying babies in doctor’s offices. Tolerating such things doesn’t appear to be the right term, as we do not necessarily see a positive in the situation, but they are rather things we must bear. We want it to end, but, for whatever reason, we cannot make it. Toleration seems to be a bit more than our putting up with something. Toleration entails that we value maintaining a structure and society that permits these things, even if we disagree with them. In an ideal world, there would be no rude customers (or clerks), but in an ideal world people would still hold beliefs contrary to ours because there is a value in it. Toleration means that we allow any beliefs to be held, discussed, shared, and spread, as well as, most importantly, that we foster an atmosphere that allows for it. This goes beyond merely putting up with a belief, since we are responsible for maintaining a public forum where such views can be expressed.

    Essentially, I am arguing that there is a value in maintaining a “marketplace of ideas” in modern, liberal society. This concept was first discussed by John Milton in the 17th century, popularized by John Stuart Mill in the 19th, and employed by many later legal theorists. We have a “free marketplace” where anyone can express anything, and those ideas worth having will be adopted, and those with little value will fall to the wayside. Ideas can compete and people can make up their own minds on the worth of the ideas being “sold,” with those having higher values gaining that value, in some part, by the disvalue in other ideas. If we prevent ideas from entering the marketplace, then we run the serious risk of blocking the truth, for any idea may be right or contain some kernel of the truth. We cannot silence any ideas, but we can beat them down in the marketplace as being worthless. Those harmful beliefs that some people hold will inevitably meet this fate.

    So why do we tolerate beliefs that we think lead to wrong actions? Because if we label certain beliefs as dangerous by merely being expressed, we are traveling down a dangerous road. How are we going to determine which beliefs are problematic and which are not? What criteria will we use? What is the threshold of danger we’ll use? Nothing that I have said should be construed as the idea we ought to promote beliefs that we find as problematic. Toleration does not mean we give up our ability to challenge and assault certain beliefs and do what we can to sway others away from holding them. We would also appear to be under a moral obligation to try to change the beliefs of those that we think are wrong.

    To bring this discussion to the topic of religion, we ought to tolerate religious beliefs, but not actions, in the ways I have laid out. Religious beliefs tend to be special because of how deeply they can be held and how fundamentally they can conflict across individuals. Yet, they ought to be treated the same – or, perhaps, given even more protections due to their sacred status. Even if there are certain beliefs that we find no value in and can only see as leading to harmful actions, we still have a duty to foster an environment where they can be held and expressed openly, especially when those beliefs are religious. Without doing this, we cannot be confident that our own beliefs are proper and correct. No matter how different other beliefs are and how certain we are that we are right, we still ought to tolerate those other beliefs. We cannot silence others, even when we think we have the truth; we can, and should, try to show them the light.

    For Review and Discussion

    1. What are some beliefs you tolerate? What beliefs do you not tolerate?

    2. What is the different between “putting up with” something and tolerating it? What are examples of things you “put up with” and how are these different than things you might tolerate?

    3. Do you think we ought to tolerate all religious beliefs as the author says? If so, why? If not, where would the line be drawn? Does toleration mean that we have to tolerate the actions associated with these religious beliefs?


    This page titled 5.4: Tolerance in a Global Society (Noah Levin) is shared under a CC BY 4.0 license and was authored, remixed, and/or curated by Noah Levin (NGE Far Press) .

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