2.7: Empires and Globalization
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\(\newcommand{\avec}{\mathbf a}\) \(\newcommand{\bvec}{\mathbf b}\) \(\newcommand{\cvec}{\mathbf c}\) \(\newcommand{\dvec}{\mathbf d}\) \(\newcommand{\dtil}{\widetilde{\mathbf d}}\) \(\newcommand{\evec}{\mathbf e}\) \(\newcommand{\fvec}{\mathbf f}\) \(\newcommand{\nvec}{\mathbf n}\) \(\newcommand{\pvec}{\mathbf p}\) \(\newcommand{\qvec}{\mathbf q}\) \(\newcommand{\svec}{\mathbf s}\) \(\newcommand{\tvec}{\mathbf t}\) \(\newcommand{\uvec}{\mathbf u}\) \(\newcommand{\vvec}{\mathbf v}\) \(\newcommand{\wvec}{\mathbf w}\) \(\newcommand{\xvec}{\mathbf x}\) \(\newcommand{\yvec}{\mathbf y}\) \(\newcommand{\zvec}{\mathbf z}\) \(\newcommand{\rvec}{\mathbf r}\) \(\newcommand{\mvec}{\mathbf m}\) \(\newcommand{\zerovec}{\mathbf 0}\) \(\newcommand{\onevec}{\mathbf 1}\) \(\newcommand{\real}{\mathbb R}\) \(\newcommand{\twovec}[2]{\left[\begin{array}{r}#1 \\ #2 \end{array}\right]}\) \(\newcommand{\ctwovec}[2]{\left[\begin{array}{c}#1 \\ #2 \end{array}\right]}\) \(\newcommand{\threevec}[3]{\left[\begin{array}{r}#1 \\ #2 \\ #3 \end{array}\right]}\) \(\newcommand{\cthreevec}[3]{\left[\begin{array}{c}#1 \\ #2 \\ #3 \end{array}\right]}\) \(\newcommand{\fourvec}[4]{\left[\begin{array}{r}#1 \\ #2 \\ #3 \\ #4 \end{array}\right]}\) \(\newcommand{\cfourvec}[4]{\left[\begin{array}{c}#1 \\ #2 \\ #3 \\ #4 \end{array}\right]}\) \(\newcommand{\fivevec}[5]{\left[\begin{array}{r}#1 \\ #2 \\ #3 \\ #4 \\ #5 \\ \end{array}\right]}\) \(\newcommand{\cfivevec}[5]{\left[\begin{array}{c}#1 \\ #2 \\ #3 \\ #4 \\ #5 \\ \end{array}\right]}\) \(\newcommand{\mattwo}[4]{\left[\begin{array}{rr}#1 \amp #2 \\ #3 \amp #4 \\ \end{array}\right]}\) \(\newcommand{\laspan}[1]{\text{Span}\{#1\}}\) \(\newcommand{\bcal}{\cal B}\) \(\newcommand{\ccal}{\cal C}\) \(\newcommand{\scal}{\cal S}\) \(\newcommand{\wcal}{\cal W}\) \(\newcommand{\ecal}{\cal E}\) \(\newcommand{\coords}[2]{\left\{#1\right\}_{#2}}\) \(\newcommand{\gray}[1]{\color{gray}{#1}}\) \(\newcommand{\lgray}[1]{\color{lightgray}{#1}}\) \(\newcommand{\rank}{\operatorname{rank}}\) \(\newcommand{\row}{\text{Row}}\) \(\newcommand{\col}{\text{Col}}\) \(\renewcommand{\row}{\text{Row}}\) \(\newcommand{\nul}{\text{Nul}}\) \(\newcommand{\var}{\text{Var}}\) \(\newcommand{\corr}{\text{corr}}\) \(\newcommand{\len}[1]{\left|#1\right|}\) \(\newcommand{\bbar}{\overline{\bvec}}\) \(\newcommand{\bhat}{\widehat{\bvec}}\) \(\newcommand{\bperp}{\bvec^\perp}\) \(\newcommand{\xhat}{\widehat{\xvec}}\) \(\newcommand{\vhat}{\widehat{\vvec}}\) \(\newcommand{\uhat}{\widehat{\uvec}}\) \(\newcommand{\what}{\widehat{\wvec}}\) \(\newcommand{\Sighat}{\widehat{\Sigma}}\) \(\newcommand{\lt}{<}\) \(\newcommand{\gt}{>}\) \(\newcommand{\amp}{&}\) \(\definecolor{fillinmathshade}{gray}{0.9}\)Imperial Consolidation
One of the simplest ways to track the impact of globalization is through the reduction of diversity. Globalization is a homogenizing process since its intensification should lead to more people following fewer ways of life. When Islam came to a new region, for example, each individual who converted represented not just an additional member of the global Islamic community, but one fewer member of the local spiritual system. Those conversions also had an impact beyond the mere adoption of a new spiritual belief. Conversion also encouraged new naming practices, new dietary norms, a new intellectual canon, and left a generational legacy since the original convert’s children would be more likely to be raised in the new tradition and, in turn, pass it on to their progeny. This example of religious adoptions and their results suggest new connections emerging benignly or organically. Of course, that is not always how peoples and societies are brought together. As we turn our attention to empires then, we will see that the sorts of interactions that drive interaction are just as often forged through the force of imperial expansion. An empire is, after all, not simply a form of political organization but also an agent of globalization. Conquest is a means of connecting diverse groups of people spread throughout large territories and helps establish an arena of exchange more intensive than would likely exist under multiple regimes. Under the auspices of these relatively centralized political systems, empires encourage, in some cases, and enforce in others greater uniformity. The period from 1450-1700 saw the emergence of some of the most influential empires in human history. These empires helped establish identities, traditions, cultures, and connections that would live on well past their lifespans. This last point is vital. The traditional presentation of the history of this era emphasizes the maritime exploits of a group of small kingdoms in the far west of Eurasia. Undoubtedly, the oceangoing voyages that would set out from these kingdoms would have huge implications for later history. However, it is important to remember that the largest, most populous, wealthiest, and most dynamic states in the world up to 1700 were the great land empires that commanded the bulk of the human population and had an unmatched ability to impact the lives of their subjects.
The Turkic Empires
One of the great trends of empire-building during this era was the emergence of several empires ruled by Turkic dynasties. At their height the three largest of these – the Ottoman, the Safavid, and the Mughal – controlled territory that stretched almost to the Atlantic Ocean in the west, deep into Central Asia in the east, and nearly to the tip of the Indian subcontinent in the south. In controlling this huge expanse of territory along with many tens of millions of subjects, these empires became some of the most influential forces of early-modern globalization.
The westward migration of Turkic-speaking groups across Asia began as early as the 6th century. Eventually, some of these migrations encountered the eastward expansion of Islam out of Arabia. For a time, a militarized frontier was established with largely animistic Turkic tribes on one side and the lands of the Islamic caliphates on the other. Turkic tribesmen captured through raids would often be sold into slavery and through this process would be Islamicized and made into the central military caste of the caliphate. At other times, entire clans or tribes would voluntarily convert and offer their military services to the highest bidder. Through this process, growing numbers of Turks became integrated into the Islamic world of West Asia. Although initially subordinate to a largely Arab or Persian ruling class, the role of Turks as a military caste would eventually translate into direct or indirect political power as well. By the 11th century, the Turkic Seljuq Sultanate would emerge as one of the most powerful states of West Asia, and the Abbasid Caliph – technically the most important figure in the Islamic World – would himself be a mere puppet to his Turkic military commanders.
The expansion of the Mongol Empire further dispersed Turkic groups throughout Central and Western Asia but also left a legacy of state formation in which Turkic elites would play a key role. While the full story is very complex, we can focus on three contiguous empires that, although often rivals, would collectively establish a peak of Turkic power by the end of the 16th century. The Ottoman Empire, the Safavid Empire, and the Mughal Empire had diverse origins, timelines, and governing ideologies, but shared a style of warfare that made effective use of gunpowder weapons (Figure 2.7.1 and Figure 2.7.2), a similar basis on a dynastic elite ruling over populations that were internally diverse as well as different from the conquering group, and the survival of certain nomadic traditions even as the actual way of life had become inconvenient to the task of ruling over large agrarian populations.
The other thing the three empires shared, of course, is that they were all founded and ruled by Muslims. The Islamic character of the ruling groups was certainly significant to elements of their rule and was also key to their claims to legitimacy, but we must be careful not to be too deterministic when it comes to religious identity. Islam certainly defined the three empires in crucial ways but does not explain everything about their manner of rule. Especially for the Ottoman and Mughal Empires, which contained large numbers of non-Muslims, it was necessary to strike a delicate balance. Should the regimes appeal too strongly to their co-religionists, and especially the ulema (Muslim religious scholars), there was a danger that they could alienate their non-Muslim subjects. If, on the other hand, they embraced non-Muslims too closely they risked offending their strict Muslim supporters. None of the three empires could afford to present themselves to their subjects as any one thing. Depending on their audience, they had to be universal rulers with an almost secular claim to power, pious Muslim dynasts who ruled according to Islamic law, rugged nomadic conquerors who legitimized themselves using traditional Turkic origin narratives, or cultured benefactors of art, literature, and architecture adorned in the finest silks, most brightly dyed cottons, and softest furs. As a result, strictly using the lens of Islam to understand these empires would leave us with only a partial sense of the history.
Beyond Islam specifically, the broader point is that simple binaries like Christian/Muslim, Muslim/Hindu, Sunni/Shi’a, or secular/spiritual are rarely the most useful way of thinking about human societies and especially in the pre-modern world. Christian and Muslim states in western Eurasia were indeed often rivals with each other. That doesn’t mean, however, that Christians and Muslims would have seen themselves as participants in a “clash of civilizations” as certain contemporary scholars would have us believe. Rather, most people, regardless of religious identity, would have thought in terms of the interests of themselves, their families, and their communities. Carter Findley, for instance, has noted that during the early Ottoman expansion, “many local Christians appear to have been happy to pass under the rule of an expanding polity with relatively light taxes.” In other words, they cared more about how they were ruled than who it was that ruled them. Forms of identity that would later become fundamental, were not necessarily as significant in these earlier periods. Where the modern world would become defined by the creation of clearly defined categories of belonging, the premodern world was far more ambiguous and fluid. It is useful to remind ourselves that there is nothing eternal or inherent about the things that divide us. Instead, these divisions themselves have a history.
The history of each of these empires is fascinating in its own right, but for this chapter, I want to focus on the more specific issue of how each of them addressed the issue of diversity and difference. Each ruled over a diverse set of subject peoples, and each managed that difference in distinct ways. The Ottoman-ruled over a population with a similar proportion of Muslims and Christians (of different denominations) and a small but significant number of Jews. Within the Ottoman system, Muslims were privileged in the formal governing structure, with both the military and the bureaucracy closed to non-Muslims, and Islamic law was paramount in Islamic courts. At the same time, the empire made no particular effort to reduce religious, linguistic, or cultural differences. Communities were allowed significant amounts of autonomy and disputes between, for instance, Christians could be settled according to Christian legal traditions. Conversely, the Safavid Dynasty’s legitimacy was based on specific religious claims and thus from the late-16th century, there was a more concerted attempt on the part of the empire to impose their version of Shi’a Islam upon their subjects who had previously been mostly Sunni. Finally, the Mughal were the most heterodox of all. Ruling a population in which Muslims were a significant minority meant that Islam did not serve as a legitimizing ideology. Instead, the early Mughal emperors embraced a range of spiritual and philosophical ideas while often distancing themselves from the more conservative Muslim ulema. Indeed, the emperors Akbar and Jahangir sometimes angered such tradition-minded Muslims by patronizing Sufi sheiks (whose beliefs and practices were often seen as heretical) and even Hindu yogis. One of the most famous paintings from Jahangir's reign, for instance, is titled "Jahangir Preferring a Sufi Shaikh to Kings" and was produced by a Hindu court artist named Bichitr. The painting depicts the emperor Jahangir giving a book to the Sufi Shaikh Salim. He gives his full attention to the Shaikh while ignoring the three other men. The first is an Ottoman sultan, the second is King James I of England, and the third is the painter Bichitr himself (Figure 2.7.3). Later emperors did revert to more traditional Islamic practice, but the empire would continue to fill positions of privilege with non-Muslims throughout its history. Even the emperor Aurangzeb, who is often portrayed as a persecutor of Hindus, employed significant numbers of Hindu elites in his court and his military. Regardless of how they approached the issue, the Ottoman, Safavid, and Mughal empires had profound effects on the culture and ways of life of the peoples of their empire (including the ruling group).
Empires like the Ottoman, Mughal, and Safavid were key drivers of cultural, social, political, and economic change in the early modern world. By connecting millions of people under something like centralized rule they established much of the foundation upon which the modern world would be built.
![Painting of a man sitting upon an hourglass taking a book from a bearded man. Three other men sit at the man's feet. Details in text.](https://human.libretexts.org/@api/deki/files/121969/Bichitr_-_Jahangir_Preferring_a_Sufi_Shaikh_to_Kings%252C_from_the_St._Petersburg_album_-_Google_Art_Project.jpg?revision=1&size=bestfit&width=679&height=988)
"Jahangir Preferring a Sufi Shaikh to Kings, 1616," Bichitr, in the Public Domain.
- In what ways do empires drive globalization?
- Is it useful to think of the Ottoman, Safavid, and Mughal as "Islamic empires" given how differently they governed their populations?