3.5: Theodicies as a Response to the Problem of Evil (Tom Metcalf)

Theodicies as a Response to the Problem of Evil
Tom Metcalf³⁰

20.1 The Problem of Evil

Consider the following, hypothetical event (cf. Rowe 1979):

Lightning strikes a tree, which causes a forest fire. A fawn is very badly burned in the fire and lies in agony for an hour before finally dying.

Now, if I had the ability to prevent the fawn’s suffering, I would. I would be cruel for letting it suffer when I could prevent that suffering. This obvious truth is entailed by the following premise:

(1) [The Moral Premise] If moral facts exist at all, then the set of moral reasons that exist contains all and only the moral reasons that experts hold to be true.

In other words, experts’ view of morality is probably true, given that moral facts exist at all. Experts—ethicists—hold that it’s morally wrong to allow extreme, pointless suffering.

Of course, in real life, as far as we know, such events as the fawn’s suffering happen very frequently. Nonhuman animals suffer greatly and die prematurely. That claim seems to be entailed by the following premise:

(2) [The Scientific Premise] Setting aside the Theory of Evolution and the Big Bang Theory, the physical world is more-or-less the way scientists’ consensus holds it to be. (To make things easier, I’ve set aside two theories that might be controversial to the theist.)

Last, let’s consider one more premise:

(3) If God exists, then God is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect (cf. Anselm 1998: Chapter II).

In fact, let’s just assume that (3) is true. The Problem of Evil usually isn’t used to try to argue against the existence of a God that doesn’t resemble the God described in (3). Therefore, in the space we have here, we’re only going to consider theodicies (i.e. explanations for why a morally perfect God might choose to allow evil) that purport to defend belief in the God mentioned in (3).

Proponents of the Problem of Evil believe that (1), (2), and (3) together provide strong evidence against the existence of God. Why? Well, let’s assume that (1) entails:

(4) If one knows of, and can eliminate, some gratuitous suffering (i.e. suffering that one has no moral obligation to allow and suffering that isn’t necessary for some equal-or-greater good), then one all-things-considered ought to eliminate that suffering.

But someone might argue for the following, interesting premise:

(5) [The Key] If (setting aside the Theory of Evolution and the Big Bang Theory) the physical world is more-or-less the way scientists’ consensus holds it to be, then probably, some gratuitous suffering exists.

From which it would follow that:

(6) Probably, some gratuitous suffering exists.

And we know that (3) entails:

(7) If God exists, then God knows of, and can eliminate, any gratuitous suffering. And if God exists, then God always does what he all-things-considered ought to do, which entails

(8) If God exists, then there is no gratuitous suffering.

Finally, we can put that together with (6) to conclude:

(9) Probably, God does not exist.

The only controversial premises of that argument are the Moral Premise, the Scientific Premise, and the Key. The argument we end up with is deductively valid, meaning that if the premises are true, then the conclusion must be true. In the rest of this article, I’ll defend the Key, thereby arguing that there is no adequate solution to the Problem of Evil.

20.2 Theodicism, Skepticism, Radicalism, and Mooreanism

People who offer theodicies offer reasons to reject the Key. In particular, they offer some attempted explanation of why some suffering that exists isn’t gratuitous after all. These are normally explanations for why God, despite his moral perfection, might choose not to eliminate that suffering. Let’s now define four related theories.

Theodicism

The theory that some theodicy is true, i.e., that the Key is false because there is some good explanation for why none of the suffering we know of is gratuitous.

Skepticism

The theory that we aren’t very good at assessing whether any suffering is gratuitous, or that we don’t know whether suffering really exists (cf. Wykstra 1984).

Radicalism

The theory that (4) above is false, i.e. that it might not be morally obligatory to eliminate all gratuitous suffering (cf. Kraay 2010; van Inwagen 1988: 167 ff.).

Mooreanism

The theory that the Key is false, because while there is substantial evidence that gratuitous suffering does exist, there is enough positive evidence for God’s existence to justify our ultimately concluding that gratuitous suffering does not exist (cf. Rowe 1979: 339 and Plantinga 2008: 170-71).

Obviously, a theist could embrace some or all of these theories. In the space we have here, we can’t talk very much about Skepticism, Radicalism, or Mooreanism, but I wanted to mention them to ensure that we knew all of our options. But now I’ll critique several theodicies (cf. Trakakis 2007: Chapters 9, 10, and 11 for extended critique of theodicies).

20.3 Sin-Related Theodicies: Free Will and Punishment

Some theodicies have a lot to do with humans’ free will and the evil that we sometimes commit (Plantinga 1977: 33-34; Plantinga 2004).

One of the most popular theodicies is the Free-Will Theodicy, according to which God doesn’t prevent all the suffering we see because at least some of that suffering is the results of creatures’ free-will decisions, and it would be wrong for God to suppress our free will. Indeed, perhaps there are some creatures who, no matter what, would freely choose to create some suffering, and so it’s just inevitable that if God doesn’t intervene, they will indeed create that suffering. Yet we often think that freedom is very morally valuable. For example, it might be possible for the government to greatly reduce suffering by imposing a new policy: everyone must be brainwashed to be morally good. But many of us would object to that policy. Therefore, one might argue, the Key is false: what we thought was gratuitous suffering is actually justified by its relationship to free will.

The Free Will Theodicy has several problems (cf. Mackie 1955: 208 ff.):

1. Much suffering (such as the fawn’s suffering) doesn’t appear to be the result of anyone’s free-will choices. Some theodicists have responded by arguing that possibly, even natural disasters are the results of evil spirits’ free-will choices (cf. Allen 2003). This might be independently implausible. But it leads us to the next problem.

2. Normally, it’s morally permissible or even obligatory to violate evil creatures’ freedom of action in various ways. We try to put murderers and rapists in jail, and it’s positively morally wrong to let them go free.

3. Indeed, God himself greatly restricts creatures’ freedom of action already, because he has created laws of nature. If I could shoot deadly laser-beams out of my eyes, I could cause a lot more suffering, but God doesn’t let me. How is that not a violation of my free will?

4. Free will may not even exist. Indeed, most philosophers disbelieve in the existence of libertarian free will, which is the variety of free will that might be required for the Free Will Theodicy to really work (Bourget and Chalmers 2014: 476).

Relatedly, consider the Punishment Theodicy (cf. Menn 2002: 174). Maybe suffering is punishment for our moral evil. According to some varieties of theism, all human beings are evil, or at least sinful, and so maybe we deserve punishment.

There are many powerful objections to this theodicy:

1. Nonhuman animals, such as the fawn, are presumably innocent and deserve no punishment. The same is plausibly true about young children.

2. Punishment doesn’t seem distributed by moral goodness or evil. For example, many good people suffer, and many evil people prosper.

3. As before, the right sort of free will might not even exist, which would make punishment—at least punishment on the scale of hundreds of thousands of children’s dying in natural disasters—unjust.

20.4 Mental-State Theodicies: Soul-Making, Contrast, Knowledge

Another set of theodicies has to do with our mental states: our virtues and character traits and our knowledge.

A popular theodicy is the Soul-Making Theodicy (cf. Hick 1977: 375). Arguably, it is a good thing that human beings develop various virtues: good character-traits. It might be, in fact, that the best sorts of virtues are those we develop by freely choosing to respond in the right way to various instances of suffering. If I witness pain, I might freely choose to respond compassionately, thereby developing compassion. If I witness danger, I might freely choose to respond bravely, thereby developing courage. And so God might allow a world with a fair amount of suffering in it, because it makes room for these very valuable goods: the freely-developed virtues of humanity.

Similarly, some have argued (as the Contrast or Knowledge theodicies (cf. Mackie 1955: 206)) that human beings cannot recognize and appreciate God’s goodness if we don’t know about suffering as well. Maybe witnessing tragedy makes us appreciate the world and the good things in it more, or know how important moral goodness really is.

As with the Free Will Theodicy, the Soul-Making Theodicy and the Contrast and Knowledge Theodicies have several problems:

1. Presumably, much of the suffering that goes on is never witnessed by any human. (This is the case, for example, with the fawn in the story above.) Maybe merely estimating that such suffering occurs is enough for us to develop virtues, but it certainly seems far weaker than if we had witnessed or experienced the suffering firsthand. The same goes for developing knowledge or appreciation of goodness.

2. It’s possible to challenge the value of these virtues after all. One might first challenge the value of their being created by free-will choices (especially if free will might not exist). Why didn’t God just create us with the virtues already in us? And why didn’t God create that knowledge in us already? And how valuable is that knowledge, really: valuable enough to justify letting innocent creatures suffer extreme harms?

3. Perhaps witnessing suffering actually makes humans develop vices, too. Maybe witnessing pain makes us develop the vice of schadenfreude, which is taking pleasure in others’ suffering. Maybe witnessing poverty makes us even more miserly. And maybe witnessing suffering allows us to develop knowledge of suffering and how to create more suffering, or think that the suffering in the world is particularly bad, rather than appreciating goodness.

4. The Soul-Making Theodicy in general depends on a substantive empirical claim: that encountering suffering in general makes us more virtuous. Is there good evidence for that claim? We can certainly think of examples of it, but those are largely anecdotal, and I don’t know of any evidence that witnessing suffering reliably makes humans much more virtuous. Now, the theodicist could argue that our soul-making might occur even after we die, in other worlds, but that might strike some people as implausible or at least as otherwise complicating this hypothesis. Similarly, I don’t know of any studies that show that witnessing suffering makes people appreciate goodness a lot more.

20.5 Some General Problems with All Theodicies

Some philosophers have argued that there are serious problems with the very project of theodicy. We’ll look at two such problems.

20.5.1 The Total-Quantity Objection

We are assuming that God would eliminate any gratuitous suffering. Therefore, the theodicist must hold that the current amount of suffering in the world is exactly the right amount: that if a tiny bit less suffering occurred, the world would be overall worse, or that God would do something wrong by eliminating even a tiny bit of the suffering. For example, God would have been wrong to cause the fawn to die one second sooner than it did (cf. Weinstock 1974).

Some philosophers argue that this hypothesis is very implausible. It seems very unlikely that if the fawn had died one second sooner, the world would somehow have been worse; instead it seems as if this world would’ve been better. Similarly, it seems very unlikely that if one fewer child had died in some recent natural disaster, the world would have been worse.

20.5.2 Allowing Suffering in Order to Benefit Others

Recall some of the theodicies mentioned above: God allows suffering in order to produce various goods, such as soul-making, or to avoid violating others’ rights, as in the Free-Will Theodicy. But this may be cold comfort to those who experience suffering. Suppose an evil person tortures and murders my family. I read about theodicies and learn that perhaps some people will be more compassionate now. But I might be reasonable in asking: How does that help me? And how does it help my family (cf. Trakakis 2007: 175 ff.)?

Analogy: Suppose a doctor has five patients who are dying of organ failure, and one healthy patient who is in the clinic for a routine examination (cf. Foot 1967). The doctor notices that if she kills the healthy patient and distributes his organs, she can save the five dying patients. Yet most people think the doctor should not do this. But how is allowing innocent people and nonhuman animals to suffer, in order to produce goods for other people, not very similar? How is it fair to allow hundreds of thousands of poor people to die in floods, in order to produce virtues in other people? Allowing innocent people and nonhuman animals to suffer in order to produce other goods seems analogous to the doctor’s wrongful act. Perhaps suffering should only be allowed if it somehow benefits the sufferer, but it’s not obvious how most suffering really does this.

20.6 Conclusion

There are many serious problems with all of the theodicies we’ve considered, and two general problems with the very project of theodicy, at least as it has appeared so far. Therefore, defenders of Anselmian theism should hope for the success of skepticism, radicalism, or Mooreanism, or else seek a new theodicy, one that has not yet appeared in the literature.

References

Allen, Robert Francis. 2003. “St. Augustine’s Free Will Theodicy and Natural Evil.” Ars Disputandi 3(1): 84-90.

Anselm, “Proslogion.” 1998. In Anselm of Canterbury: The Major Works, ed. Brian Davies and G. R. Evans (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press), pp. 82-104.

Bourget, David, and David J. Chalmers. 2014. “What do Philosophers Believe?” Philosophical Studies 170 (3): 465-500.

Foot, Philippa. 1967. “The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect.” Oxford Review 5: 5-15.

Hick, John. 1977. Evil and the God of Love, 2nd ed. New York, NY: HarperCollins.

Kraay, Klaas J. 2010. “Theism, Possible Worlds, and the Multiverse.” Philosophical Studies 147 (3): 355-68.

Mackie, J. L. “Evil and Omnipotence.” Mind 64(254): 200-12.

Menn, Stephen. 2002. Descartes and Augustine. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Plantinga, Alvin. 1977. God, Freedom, and Evil. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.

Plantinga, Alvin. 2004. “Supralapsarianism, or ‘O Felix Culpa’.” In Peter van Inwagen (Ed.), Christian Faith and the Problem of Evil (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co.), 1-25.

Plantinga, Alvin. 2008. “Reply to Tooley’s Opening Statement.” In Alvin Plantinga and Michael Tooley, Knowledge of God (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing): 151-83.

Reichenbach, Bruce. 1976. “Natural Evils and Natural Laws: A Theodicy for Natural Evils.” International Philosophical Quarterly 16(2): 179-96.

Rowe, William L. 1979. “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism.” American Philosophical Quarterly 6 (4): 335-41.

Trakakis, Nick. 2007. The God Beyond Belief: In Defence of William Rowe’s Evidential Argument from Evil. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer.

Van Inwagen, Peter. 1988. “The Magnitude, Duration, and Distribution of Evil: A Theodicy.” Philosophical Topics XIV (2): 161-87.

Van Inwagen, Peter. 1991. “The Problem of Evil, the Problem of Air, and the Problem of Silence.” Philosophical Perspectives 5: 135-65.

Weinstock, Jerome A. 1974. “What Theodicies Must, But Do Not, Do.” Philosophia 4 (4): 449-67.

Wykstra, Stephen J. 1984. “The Human Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering: On Avoiding the Evils of ‘Appearance.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 16 (2): 73-94.

For Review and Discussion

1. Is the author right in arguing that the problem of gratuitous evil poses a serious problem for Anselmian theists and that the traditional theodicies do not provide an acceptable response?

2. Describe the ways that one might argue there does not exist gratuitous suffering in the world.

3. The author suggests that skepticism (that we don’t actually know enough about suffering to properly claim some of it is gratuitous), radicalism (that gratuitous suffering is compatible with an omnibenevolent God), or Mooreanism (that the evidence for God existing is so strong that any suffering is not gratuitous) provide a stronger grounds for responding to the problem of evil. Think through how each of these responses might work and consider if they are stronger than traditional theodicies.