4.8: The Spirited Part of the Soul
- Page ID
- 94523
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\(\newcommand{\avec}{\mathbf a}\) \(\newcommand{\bvec}{\mathbf b}\) \(\newcommand{\cvec}{\mathbf c}\) \(\newcommand{\dvec}{\mathbf d}\) \(\newcommand{\dtil}{\widetilde{\mathbf d}}\) \(\newcommand{\evec}{\mathbf e}\) \(\newcommand{\fvec}{\mathbf f}\) \(\newcommand{\nvec}{\mathbf n}\) \(\newcommand{\pvec}{\mathbf p}\) \(\newcommand{\qvec}{\mathbf q}\) \(\newcommand{\svec}{\mathbf s}\) \(\newcommand{\tvec}{\mathbf t}\) \(\newcommand{\uvec}{\mathbf u}\) \(\newcommand{\vvec}{\mathbf v}\) \(\newcommand{\wvec}{\mathbf w}\) \(\newcommand{\xvec}{\mathbf x}\) \(\newcommand{\yvec}{\mathbf y}\) \(\newcommand{\zvec}{\mathbf z}\) \(\newcommand{\rvec}{\mathbf r}\) \(\newcommand{\mvec}{\mathbf m}\) \(\newcommand{\zerovec}{\mathbf 0}\) \(\newcommand{\onevec}{\mathbf 1}\) \(\newcommand{\real}{\mathbb R}\) \(\newcommand{\twovec}[2]{\left[\begin{array}{r}#1 \\ #2 \end{array}\right]}\) \(\newcommand{\ctwovec}[2]{\left[\begin{array}{c}#1 \\ #2 \end{array}\right]}\) \(\newcommand{\threevec}[3]{\left[\begin{array}{r}#1 \\ #2 \\ #3 \end{array}\right]}\) \(\newcommand{\cthreevec}[3]{\left[\begin{array}{c}#1 \\ #2 \\ #3 \end{array}\right]}\) \(\newcommand{\fourvec}[4]{\left[\begin{array}{r}#1 \\ #2 \\ #3 \\ #4 \end{array}\right]}\) \(\newcommand{\cfourvec}[4]{\left[\begin{array}{c}#1 \\ #2 \\ #3 \\ #4 \end{array}\right]}\) \(\newcommand{\fivevec}[5]{\left[\begin{array}{r}#1 \\ #2 \\ #3 \\ #4 \\ #5 \\ \end{array}\right]}\) \(\newcommand{\cfivevec}[5]{\left[\begin{array}{c}#1 \\ #2 \\ #3 \\ #4 \\ #5 \\ \end{array}\right]}\) \(\newcommand{\mattwo}[4]{\left[\begin{array}{rr}#1 \amp #2 \\ #3 \amp #4 \\ \end{array}\right]}\) \(\newcommand{\laspan}[1]{\text{Span}\{#1\}}\) \(\newcommand{\bcal}{\cal B}\) \(\newcommand{\ccal}{\cal C}\) \(\newcommand{\scal}{\cal S}\) \(\newcommand{\wcal}{\cal W}\) \(\newcommand{\ecal}{\cal E}\) \(\newcommand{\coords}[2]{\left\{#1\right\}_{#2}}\) \(\newcommand{\gray}[1]{\color{gray}{#1}}\) \(\newcommand{\lgray}[1]{\color{lightgray}{#1}}\) \(\newcommand{\rank}{\operatorname{rank}}\) \(\newcommand{\row}{\text{Row}}\) \(\newcommand{\col}{\text{Col}}\) \(\renewcommand{\row}{\text{Row}}\) \(\newcommand{\nul}{\text{Nul}}\) \(\newcommand{\var}{\text{Var}}\) \(\newcommand{\corr}{\text{corr}}\) \(\newcommand{\len}[1]{\left|#1\right|}\) \(\newcommand{\bbar}{\overline{\bvec}}\) \(\newcommand{\bhat}{\widehat{\bvec}}\) \(\newcommand{\bperp}{\bvec^\perp}\) \(\newcommand{\xhat}{\widehat{\xvec}}\) \(\newcommand{\vhat}{\widehat{\vvec}}\) \(\newcommand{\uhat}{\widehat{\uvec}}\) \(\newcommand{\what}{\widehat{\wvec}}\) \(\newcommand{\Sighat}{\widehat{\Sigma}}\) \(\newcommand{\lt}{<}\) \(\newcommand{\gt}{>}\) \(\newcommand{\amp}{&}\) \(\definecolor{fillinmathshade}{gray}{0.9}\)See 439e-441c. Socrates considers the example of Leontius, who finds himself at the site of an execution, desiring to gaze upon the corpses, but at the same time desiring not to. Socrates judges, again, that at least two distinct sources of motivation must exist to explain the phenomenon. The desire to gaze upon the corpses is characteristic of what he is calling the appetitive part, an urge with no concern for anything beyond getting satisfied. But what is the nature of the opposing desire? Is it the rational part at work again, seeking to do what is good overall, or is it something else? Socrates describes Leontius as disgusted, and then, when he gives in to his appetitive desire, as angry. Is this the rational part getting angry with the appetitive part? Is the same part getting both disgusted and angry? Socrates leaves the details of the Leontius example unexplained, but he suggests that anger indicates the presence of a third source of motivation, a spirited part of the soul, which often allies itself with the rational part, but never with the appetitive part. It is particularly in evidence when people become aware that they have been treated unjustly; then it boils up, motivating the soul to fight for what it believes to be just, enabling the soul to endure “hunger, cold, and every imposition of that sort . . . stand firm and win out over them, not ceasing its noble efforts until it achieves its purpose, or dies, or like a dog being called to heal by a shepherd, is called back by the reason alongside it and becomes gentle.” That this spirited part is not just the rational part getting angry can be seen from examples of the rational part doing just this, leashing in anger like a dog. Socrates gives one such example from Homer. Odysseus, twenty years away from home, returns to find his house overrun with arrogant, ill-mannered men, pestering his wife and son, and cavorting with the servant women. Anger wells up in his heart, and he desires to slay the servant women on the spot; but the rational part of his soul, looking ahead as usual, pulls back and devises a plan that will take out the men as well. How then does Socrates understand the nature of the spirited part of the soul? It is the seat of anger and righteous indignation, and it can be directed outwardly at other people, or inwardly at the appetitive part of the soul. In Book VIII, when Socrates describes what it is like for a person to be ruled by the spirited part, it will be clear that he thinks it desires honor above all – the esteem of other people – and that it therefore lies at the root of a number of important interpersonal concerns: praise, blame, shame, guilt, resentment, revenge, ambitious competitiveness, and concern for reputation. So when Leontius gets angry at himself, it is most likely out of shame. He doesn’t want to be known as the sort of person who has a strong appetitive desire to gaze at corpses. It may be helpful to think of the concerns of the spirited part falling in between those of the appetitive part and the rational part. The appetitive part desires to do for the moment what appears to be pleasant at the moment. The rational part desires to take all relevant concerns into account and do whatever is best. The spirited part desires to achieve something in between – the esteem of other people. (Students who have read some Freud often wonder whether his “id,” “ego,” and “superego” are supposed to be the same things as the appetitive, spirited, and rational parts of the soul. Although Freud’s id is similar to Socrates’ appetitive part, and the superego – focusing as it does on delaying gratification for the sake of higher social goods – is similar to the rational part, Freud’s ego is nothing like the spirited part. Freud imagines the ego seeking compromise and balance between the opposing elements of the id and superego. But the spirited part as Socrates describes it has desires all its own, and in a just soul, these desires are to be satisfied only when subordinated to the desires of the rational part. Justice is best thought of, not as a mediated conflict, but as a benevolent monarchy.)
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Some students think Socrates’ examples involving what he takes to be the spirited part of the soul are better explained by supposing that either the rational part or the appetitive part is flaring up in passion. Consider, however, the case of a competitive wrestler who denies himself food so as to be able to “make weight” (weigh-in low on the day of the match so as to achieve a competitive edge). The wrestler’s drive to win can plainly be set in simultaneous opposition to his appetitive drive to eat. But now suppose his rational part is also pitted against his competitive drive, pulling away from this thirst for victory-at-any-cost and towards a more balanced, thoughtful, integrated life. It would seem that the wrestler’s appetitive and rational desires are both pitted against a third desire. Is this example sufficient to prove that Socrates is right in thinking that there is a third, spirited part of the soul?
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Is it true that anger never allies itself with appetitive desire? Consider the fierce defensiveness that can flare up when people trying to hide their drug addiction are confronted about their problem.
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Glaucon suggests at one point that children are “full of spirit right from birth” even though they are incapable of “rational calculation.” The souls of newborns presumably lack an active rational part, but is it true that they have an active spirited part? Newborns cry, of course, but is it ever anger they express when they cry?
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Newborns often cry when they should be sleeping. But is this crying ever in opposition to a desire to sleep? They need the sleep, but do they desire it?
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Do newborns have anything in them to oppose their appetitive desires?
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Does the awarding of shiny medals and colorful ribbons to soldiers make sense? What would Socrates think?