10.2: Postwar Politics

The rapid economic and demographic growth of the postwar period created a host of problems that defied individual and even municipal-level solution. Increasingly, Californians turned to government to regulate and guide the process of change. On the state level, Governor Warren’s two successors continued his legacy of support for education, social services, resource development, and highway construction, and enlarged the state’s role in protecting environmental quality. On a local level, city governments responded to the negative impact of unbridled growth by forming regional partnerships with their neighbors. Growing numbers of Californians also demanded that local government take a more active role in protecting the rights of working people and ethnic minorities and in bringing the disadvantaged into the economic mainstream through increased social spending. The democratic ideals that fueled support for the war effort, they argued, must now be applied at home.

These general political currents, however, were overshadowed by the anti- Communist hysteria of the early Cold War years. In California and the nation as a whole, fear of internal subversion temporarily limited the pace and extent of political change. Conservative Republicans were alarmed by liberal inroads into state and local politics, the growing power of organized labor, and the new political clout of ethnic minorities. In response, they mounted a counteroffensive by mobilizing the anti-Communist rhetoric of the late 1940s and early 1950s. Accusing their mostly Democratic opponents of being “soft on Communism,” they created a political atmosphere charged with fear, intolerance, suspicion, and opportunism. Their attacks not only had a devastating impact on organized labor, civil rights organizations, higher education, and Hollywood, but also convinced many ordinary Californians that “a liberal is only a hop, skip, and a jump from a Communist.”

Democrats, however, gradually recovered their political credibility by promoting “responsible liberalism,” creating a more effective party structure, and highlighting the excessive conservatism of their opponents. In 1958, Californians elected a Democratic governor, and a Democratic majority to both houses of the state legislature. Locally, liberals also made significant progress in removing Republicans from city office and electing leadership that supported a stronger regulatory and planning role for government. Liberalism, rather than radicalism or conservatism, ultimately prevailed.

California’s Red Scare

Although Californians voted overwhelmingly for a liberal Democratic agenda in 1958, many citizens—perhaps a majority—spent the early postwar period suspecting that liberalism amounted to Communism. Governor Earl Warren and his immediate successor, Goodwin Knight, were both Republicans. And although they supported liberal policies that angered their party’s conservatives, they escaped direct attack. Democratic candidates, progressive organizations, and any individual or institution supporting liberal causes were not as fortunate.

In 1938, the U.S. Congress established the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) to root out subversives on a national level. After the war, HUAC’s first major target was the Hollywood film industry, whose writers, directors, and actors were accused of harboring left-wing sympathies. Not coincidentally, industry workers had just concluded a major studio strike, underscoring the growing power of organized labor in the state. Starting in 1947, HUAC held hearings on the “Red Menace in Hollywood” with the full cooperation of many industry leaders, including Ronald Reagan, president of the Screen Actors Guild, and studio owners Louis B. Mayer, Jack Warner, and Walt Disney.

In the course of the hearings, several prominent screenwriters, known as the Hollywood Ten, refused to provide testimony about their political beliefs and affiliations, citing their constitutional rights under the First Amendment. The Committee for the First Amendment—whose membership included Lauren Bacall, Humphrey Bogart, John Huston, and Frank Sinatra— attempted to come to their defense and challenge the constitutionality of the hearings. But its efforts were unsuccessful. All 10 were sentenced to prison for contempt of Congress, and nine were permanently banned from industry employment. HUAC then went on to compile a list of 324 present and former Hollywood employees with alleged Communist ties. A majority of those on this “blacklist,” many with well-established careers, lost their jobs. Equally damaging, those who remained in the industry approached their craft with more caution, avoiding content that might attract negative attention from in-house and external censors. For more than a decade, Hollywood films mirrored the conservatism and moral rigidity that characterized American culture as a whole.

The California Legislative Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American Activities, headed by Senator Jack B. Tenney and emboldened by HUAC’s high-profile Hollywood investigation, claimed that it had uncovered evidence of Communist subversion in the state government and educational system. In 1949, fearing a disruptive investigation of its own employees, the University of California, with approval from the Board of Regents, required professors to sign a loyalty oath. The state legislature approved a similar and more exacting oath for all state employees in 1950 when it adopted the Levering Act.

Within the university, the oath generated widespread protest and legal action. Maintaining that the policy violated their constitutional rights and academic freedom, numerous professors refused to sign and were fired forinsubordination. Still others resigned in protest, or refused job offers from the university because the oath offended their principles. In 1951, the Third California District Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the dissenting professors, arguing that the oath violated both tenure agreements and the state constitution. The Board of Regents, angered over faculty “insubordination,” decided to appeal the decision. After considering the appeal in 1952, the California Supreme Court ordered the reinstatement of the dismissed professors and invalidated the university’s oath on the grounds that the state, through the Levering Act, had sole authority to determine employee loyalty. The court, in other words, failed to consider the constitutionality of loyalty tests, and simply ruled that the power to require them belonged to the legislature. The state’s loyalty oath, covering all government employees, including professors, was not declared unconstitutional until 1967.

The Tenney Commission and its parent organization, HUAC, also launched investigations into subversive infiltration of labor unions and civil rights organizations. Reeling from the negative publicity generated by HUAC allegations and lacking the financial resources to mount a credible defense, numerous organizations expelled leaders and members who fell under suspicion, backed away from more militant strategies and tactics, and avoided building alliances with “subversive” groups. California’s liberal politicians came under attack as well. In a 1946 U.S. congressional race, a young World War II veteran named Richard Nixon defeated his Democratic opponent, Jerry Voorhis, by using Red Scare tactics. Although Nixon later admitted that he

Protest against the Hollywood HUAC investigation. Why did some members of the film industry, including many high-profile stars, speak out against HUAC's Hollywood investigation? Why did others, including future governor Ronald Reagan, cooperate with efforts to purge the industry of the "Red Menace"?

knew “Voorhis wasn’t a Communist,” he fell short of an apology for his smear tactics. “Nice guys and sissies,” he maintained, “didn’t win elections.” Once in Congress, Nixon advanced his political career by joining HUAC and vigorously pursuing the conviction of Alger Hiss, a State Department official who was accused of spying for the Soviet Union. Although the allegation was never proved, Hiss was convicted of perjury for denying the charges against him. And Nixon received credit for uncovering subversion at high levels of the federal government under the Democrats’ watch. On both the state and national level, Republicans used the Hiss case and other allegations of subversion from within to paint the Democrats as either “soft on Communism” or guilty of actual conspiracy.

In the 1950 U.S. Senate race, Nixon again turned to red baiting. Mischaracterizing his Democratic opponent, Helen Gahagan Douglas, as “the Pink Lady” with a Communist-like voting record in the U.S. House of Representatives, he handily won the contest. Douglas, like Voorhis, was merely a Democrat with a liberal voting record. Meanwhile, Nixon’s political fortunes advanced. Just a year after defeating Douglas, he was rewarded with the vice presidency—a clear indication that the American political process had been deeply influenced by postwar anti-Communist hysteria.

Warren and Knight

Earl Warren and his successor Goodwin J. Knight, both Republicans, held office during the height of California’s Red Scare, but, unlike Nixon, they refrained from exploiting fear to advance their political careers. Moreover, both men adopted liberal policies that greatly expanded the power of government “over the lives of the people”—policies that were heartily criticized by their more conservative colleagues. Their party affiliation, however, largely protected them from charges of subversion or softness on Communism. Warren, who characterized himself as a progressive, expanded governmental services, upgraded California’s infrastructure, and invested heavily in health, welfare, and public education. He also took a principled position on his party’s anti- Communist crusade. In 1948, Warren criticized HUAC’s Hollywood investigation and refused to support a loyalty oath for state employees. As an ex-officio regent, he attempted to convince his fellow board members that the university’s loyalty oath was ineffective and unconstitutional. He also opposed the 1950 Levering Act, which had been drafted by one of his critics, a right-wing Republican assemblyman from Los Angeles. By 1953, when Warren was named chief justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, his foes were heartened that the lieutenant governor, Goodwin J. Knight, a conservative critic of Warren’s liberal policies, would take over the office. Knight, having the incumbent’s advantage and his party’s blessing, then won the governorship in his own right in 1954.

Once firmly in office, however, Knight followed in Warren’s footsteps by supporting increased spending on infrastructure, water resource development, workers’ benefits, social services, and mental health. Even more troubling to his party’s conservatives, Knight expanded the regulatory role of government by endorsing clean air standards, and he established himself as a friend of organized labor by opposing “right-to-work” legislation (discussed on the next page). As the next election approached, Knight faced serious opposition. Two conservative rivals, Vice President Richard Nixon and Senator William Knowland, saw his office as a step toward the presidency. With proven right-wing credentials, either one could count on the financial backing of the state and national Republican Party in the 1958 election.

In 1957, Knight’s fears materialized when Knowland announced that he would run for governor. Making matters worse, Nixon supporters, angry over Knight’s refusal to endorse Nixon’s 1956 vice-presidential nomination, were sure to back Knowland. Knight’s chances of winning the primary were also undercut by a 1952 voter referendum that forced candidates to identify their party affiliation on primary ballots. The old ballot had listed incumbents at the top without revealing their party membership. Knight, as an incumbent with broad, nonpartisan appeal, would have had an advantage over rival Republicans and Democrats under the old system. Cognizant of these liabilities, Knight withdrew from the race and left the field to Knowland.

The state’s Democrats, in the meantime, regrouped. Twenty years earlier, Republicans had created an efficient, tightly knit organization to raise money and coordinate their campaigns. Having a disproportionate number of incumbents, they were also the primary beneficiaries of the old cross-filing system. And the postwar anti-Communist hysteria provided the Republicans with yet another political advantage. By the election of 1958, however, conditions had changed. The Red Scare tapered off, and many Californians now viewed its main architects as political opportunists and extremists. Moreover, the liberal policies of two Republican governors, although roundly criticized by conservatives, had visibly improved the state’s infrastructure, strengthened its economy, and improved the health and welfare of its citizens.

At the same time, election reform gave Democrats a more equal playing field in primary elections and prompted them to create a vigorous new party organization, the California Democratic Council (CDC), to advance their political agenda. By 1956, the Democrats had ample reason to be hopeful that the tide had turned in their favor. In that year’s elections, they eroded the Republican majority in the assembly from 53–27 to 42–38, and in the senate from 29–11 to 20–20. As the 1958 election approached, their prospects seemed even brighter; the Republican incumbent had dropped out of the governor’s race, and his replacement had a reputation as a right-wing extremist.

Edmund G. Brown

In 1958, Democrats chose Edmund G. (Pat) Brown, a native San Franciscan and state attorney general, to run for governor. Brown, a New Deal Democrat and active member of the CDC, had impeccable liberal credentials. During the 1940s, as district attorney for San Francisco, Brown transformed a corrupt and inefficient department into a modern, aggressive, crime-fighting unit. While waging legal battles against prostitution, gambling, juvenile delinquency, and political corruption, Brown attacked civil rights violations with equal zeal. Resisting popular opinion, he vocally condemned Japanese relocation and internment, and opposed the anti-Communist crusade against Harry Bridges, the militant leader of the International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union (ILWU). In 1950, with Governor Warren’s endorsement, Brown was elected as state attorney general. When pro-business conservatives succeeded in placing a “right-to-work” initiative on the 1958 ballot, Attorney General Brown forced them to change the proposition’s title to “Employer and Employee Relations” to avoid misleading voters. This decision bolstered Brown’s liberal, pro-labor reputation and gave him a decisive edge in the upcoming governor’s race.

The “right-to-work” initiative, which unions branded as the “right to workfor less and less and less,” became a major issue of the 1958 campaign. In many workplaces, unions secured “closed-shop” agreements from management that made union membership a condition of employment. The “right-to-work” initiative would have prohibited such restrictions, allowing employees to choose whether to join an existing union upon accepting a job. Organized labor feared that the initiative was part of a broader campaign to erode the membership and political power of unions. Knowland, determined to repudiate Warren’s and Knight’s liberal policies and to secure conservative support for the 1960 Republican presidential nomination, adopted a largely negative, anti-labor platform that highlighted his support of the right-to-work initiative. As a consequence, labor united behind Brown, exercising an unprecedented degree of organizational and political muscle. Brown, assured of union support, moved beyond this single issue to promote a broader, more optimistic agenda that consolidated support within his own party, attracted thousands of new voters, and convinced many independents and moderate Republicans to opt for his “responsible liberalism.”

Framing his opposition to the right-to-work initiative as part of a pragmatic, forward-looking plan of action, Brown succeeded in casting Knowland as an ultraconservative, overly pessimistic throwback to a bygone era. With the support of a broad new constituency, Brown won in 54 of the state’s 56 counties and secured nearly 60 percent of the total vote. Just as significantly, Brown entered office with a Democratic majority in the state senate and assembly. California voters had delivered a strong mandate in favor of governmental advocacy and activism.

Once in office, Brown moved quickly to enact his liberal agenda. Several of his proposals simply expanded existing programs. For example, Brown strengthened the state’s social safety net by increasing workers’ compensation and unemployment benefits, old age pensions, and welfare entitlements. He also continued government support for mental health benefits, education, and highway construction, and he financed programs through tax increases, much as Warren had done in creating his “rainy-day fund.”

Brown, however, was a bold innovator. He overcame opposition to the California Water Plan by stressing that it would create thousands of new jobs, benefit the state as a whole, and include adequate environmental safeguards. In a 1960 special election, preceded by an aggressive media campaign designed to convince voters of the plan’s merits, Californians approved a $1.7 billion bond measure to fund this unprecedented expansion of the state’s water infrastructure. Although Brown backed policies that accommodated economic and urban development, he strengthened government’s role in moderating the impact of rapid growth. Under his leadership, the legislature enacted consumer protection and air quality standards and created the Office of Consumer Affairs and an Air Quality Control Board to enforce the new regulations. These agencies, soon followed by others, greatly expanded the state’s regulatory framework, and reflected growing public concern over quality-of-life issues.

Brown acted with a similar degree of boldness in reorganizing the state’s system of higher education, supporting both the Master Plan and Fisher Act. He also secured legislative support for a series of political reforms proposed by a fellow Democrat, Assemblyman Jesse Unruh. The cross-filing system, modified in 1952, was abolished completely in 1959, generating more spirited electoral contests and partisan debate. Unruh, with Brown’s backing, went on to introduce a series of reforms that greatly improved legislative performance and fairness. In 1965, the legislature abandoned the antiquated system of apportioning senators by county and adopted the more equitable practice of allocating representatives by population-based districts. Finally, Unruh and Brown obtained legislative approval to create a Constitutional Revision Commission, charged with increasing the efficiency and upgrading the quality of state government. Commission reforms and supporting legislative measures streamlined executive and legislative bureaucracies and procedures, increased legislators’ salaries and staff, established year-round legislative sessions, enhanced city and county control over local affairs, reduced the qualification requirements for ballot initiatives, and afforded greater constitutional protections to California citizens. By the end of Brown’s second term, the state had a national reputation for efficient, professional government—a reputation that prompted the American Good Government Society to honor Jesse Unruh with its George Washington Award in 1967.

Brown, acknowledging the support that he received from the state’s growing African American population, placed civil rights at the top of his gubernatorial agenda and lobbied tirelessly for legislative approval. His efforts paid off in 1959, when the legislature banned discrimination in the workplace and created a new regulatory agency, the Division of Fair Employment Practices, to enforce the law. The same year, Brown obtained support for an Unruh-sponsored measure that prohibited racial discrimination in public accommodations, business and real estate transactions, and governmentfunded housing projects. Brown also supported fair housing legislation introduced by William Byron Rumford, a black assemblyman who was first elected in 1948 by a newly enlarged African American constituency in the San Francisco East Bay. In 1963, with Brown’s backing, the legislature approved the Rumford Act, a measure banning racial discrimination in the sale and rental of housing.

Although Brown had succeeded in advancing most of his liberal agenda by the end of his first term, he was exhausted by his own high standards and somewhat dispirited by his few failures. He had repeatedly pushed for an increase in the state’s minimum wage, only to meet stubborn and effective resistance from agriculture and private industry. He had also lobbied unsuccessfully against California’s death penalty and received negative publicity for delaying the execution of a violent sex offender, Caryl Chessman. Finally, Brown failed to unite his party’s delegation behind John F. Kennedy at the 1960 Democratic National Convention. Although Kennedy won the presidential nomination, California Democrats, still divided on Election Day, could not deliver the necessary votes. Kennedy lost in the state by 36,000 votes, which, much to Brown’s embarrassment, almost cost Kennedy the presidency.

Brown decided to run for a second term only after Nixon, who had lost the 1960 presidential race, announced his candidacy for governor in 1962. Nixon revived his old Red Scare tactics and accused Brown of being “soft on Communism.” Brown countered by arguing that Nixon, obviously out of touch with the state’s major issues, was intent on using the governorship as a “stepping stone to the presidency.” Californians, unmoved by Nixon’s tired rhetoric, delivered a second mandate for Brown, returning him to office and preserving the Democratic majority in the legislature. Brown’s second term, however, presented greater challenges. By the mid-1960s, Californians, either alarmed by the scope of reform or impatient with the slow pace of change, undermined liberalism’s fragile foundation.

Liberalism at the Municipal Level

On a municipal level, the problems associated with rapid economic and demographic expansion generated a new level of civic activism. In many communities, citizens elected candidates who promised to increase the professionalism and efficiency of city government and actively direct growth in positive directions. At the same time, minority activists joined with organized labor and progressive whites to forge a broader liberal agenda that called on local government to protect and advance civil rights through fair housing and employment legislation, and increased social spending.

In Berkeley, for example, small businessmen, whose primary objective was to keep taxes at a minimum by limiting the expansion of municipal services, dominated the government. By the late 1940s, liberal Democrats, concerned that the city was failing to meet the needs of its growing population—including large numbers of African American newcomers—began to run their own candidates for office. The conservative incumbents fought back by urging voters to “Keep the Communists and Campus Carpet-Baggers Out of City Hall.” Working hard to build a broad-based, multiethnic coalition during the next decade, liberals finally secured a majority on the city council and school board in 1961. Even more significantly, two of their winning candidates were black. Wasting no time, the new city government began to fulfill its platform. In early 1963, the council passed a fair housing ordinance, predating the state-level Rumford Fair Housing Act. The same year, the city became the first in the state to adopt a school integration plan. The council also improved recreation facilities in poorer sections of the city and rezoned the flatlands, which contained Berkeley’s largest black neighborhoods, to protect low-income housing from speculation and uncontrolled development.

Just to the south, in Oakland, a labor-initiated coalition mounted a similar, although less successful, attack against the city’s conservative leadership. In 1947, the Oakland Voters League (OVL), uniting left-wing unions, middleclass white liberals, and black migrants, ran candidates for five seats on the city council. Their platform struck a chord with voters. It called for the construction of public housing and schools; increased funding for recreation facilities, public health, and street improvements; the creation of a fair employment commission; the repeal of anti-labor ordinances; and a more equitable tax structure. Four of their five candidates won, giving the OVL just one seat short of a majority on the nine-member council. But conservative forces mounted a successful campaign against their liberal challengers. In the next two elections, three OVL representatives were ousted from office after being smeared as pro-Communist. Soon after, the OVL also collapsed and Oakland’s conservative leaders enjoyed the political advantage for several years to come.

In Los Angeles, yet another liberal coalition won a modest but more permanent victory. In 1947 Edward Roybal, a Mexican American army veteran and public health worker, ran unsuccessfully for the city council. Following his defeat, Roybal and his supporters formed the Community Service Organization (CSO) to register Mexican American voters and advocate for community improvements. Soon the CSO attracted the attention of the Chicago-based Industrial Areas Foundation, a group that supported grassroots community organizing efforts across the country. The foundation provided the CSO with financial support and the assistance of Fred Ross, one of its seasoned organizers. In 1949, the CSO supported Roybal’s second bid for the ninthdistrict council seat, a district that housed a growing Mexican American population, but also pockets of Jewish, Asian, African American, and Anglo voters. By focusing on issues that directly impacted all ethnic minorities and appealed to liberal whites—particularly the progressive Jewish community—CSO organizers secured Roybal’s victory over the incumbent councilman by a vote of 20,472 to 11,956. Once in office, he not only championed fair housing, employment, and educational opportunities, but also risked his political career by opposing a bill requiring city employees to take a loyalty oath. Roybal, the first Mexican American to serve on the council, remained in office until elected to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1962.

Liberal challenges, like those that took place in Berkeley, Oakland, and Los Angeles, permanently altered municipal politics in other cities throughout the state. In some cases, liberal coalitions achieved dramatic results, completely upsetting the local balance of power. But even minor victories produced significant changes. Roybal’s campaign, for example, emboldened thousands of new voters to demand the respect of elected officials, and encouraged community organizations to pursue their liberal agendas more aggressively. Despite postwar anti-Communist hysteria, changing demographics, postwar prosperity and optimism, and the problems associated with rapid growth generated an unstoppable tide of popular support for visionary, proactive leadership. Beginning close to home, where the impact of change was more immediate, this tide spread outward, sweeping Pat Brown into office in 1958 and handing him a solid mandate for change.