3.1.3: Cognitivism versus Non-Cognitivism

Key to the successful study of Metaethics is understanding the various key terminological distinctions that make up the “metaethical map”. Metaethical theories can be categorised, at least for our purposes, in respect of where they fall in the debates between Cognitivism and Non-Cognitivism, and Realism and Anti-Realism. Thus, it is a prerequisite for understanding and evaluating metaethical theories that you understand these two debates. In this section, we deal with the debate between cognitivists and non-cognitivists.

If you are a Moral Cognitivist (the “moral” prefix is assumed from hereon) then you have a particular view about the meaning of moral terms and a particular view about the psychology behind moral utterances. The former version of Cognitivism, concerned with meaning, is captured in the discussion of Semantic Cognitivism while the latter version of Cognitivism, concerned with psychology, is captured in the discussion of Psychological Cognitivism. Cognitivism, as discussed in the remainder of this chapter, is a combination of these two positions.

Semantic Cognitivism

Semantic Cognitivism (not to be confused with Realism) suggests that when we make moral claims of the form “murder is wrong” or “helping others is right” our claims can be true or false (what philosophers call truth-apt). According to the semantic cognitivist, what makes our moral statements true or false is whether or not they accurately pick out, or refer to, specifically moral aspects of the world. Thus, the semantic cognitivist views our moral language as essentially descriptive in nature; we try to describe genuinely moral features of the world and our moral claims are true when our descriptions are accurate and false when they are inaccurate.

This position really is as simple as it sounds, even though it is by no means uncontroversial. Consider a semantic cognitivist about the meaning of statements in a news report. When the reporter says that “the defendant stepped into the courthouse and gave his name and his date of birth”, then this statement will be truth-apt — it will be the kind of statement that can be described as true or false. Whether it is true or false will be determined by the accuracy of this statement as a description of features of the world; if the statement correctly refers to the features of the world identified then it will be true, if it does not then it will be false. The situation is the same for the semantic moral cognitivist, if the utterance “murder is wrong” really does pick out a moral property of wrongness associated with murder then it will be true, and false otherwise.

Crucially, keep in mind that Semantic Cognitivism only goes as far as suggesting that moral claims are truth-apt — capable of being true or false. Semantic Cognitivism, by itself, does not suggest anything about moral claims ever actually being true. To put it in another way Cognitivism has nothing to do with what actually exists in the world (that is Realism versus Anti-Realism — see below). Instead, it is purely a theory explaining the meaning of moral statements.

Psychological Cognitivism

Psychological Cognitivism (not to be confused with Realism) is the view that when we utter a moral statement we give voice to a belief, rather than any other type of non-belief attitude. So, when I utter the statement “Leicester City won the Premier League in 2015–2016”, I express my belief that this happened. According to the psychological cognitivist, I also express a belief when I make claims such as “murder is wrong” or “helping others is right”.

From here, Semantic and Psychological Cognitivism will be assumed to go together to form the cognitivist position. This is reasonable because it is most natural to think of a truth-apt utterance as being the expression of a belief, for we assume that a belief is the kind of thing that can be true or false and refers to the world. In ethics then, cognitivists claim that moral statements express truth-apt beliefs that are made true or false according to how accurately they describe the world. Moral language and moral psychology, according to the cognitivist, are not especially different to the language and psychology common to many other disciplines such as science, news journalism or non-fiction history books.

You might be wondering what all the fuss is about so far; it is probably fair to say that Cognitivism is the common sense position when it comes to moral language and our associated psychology. Of course, you might think, ethical claims are truth-apt and that we express ethical beliefs, for what else could we be doing when we engage in normative or applied ethics? Richard Joyce (1966–) is of this view when it comes to Cognitivism and our moral utterances, suggesting that “…if something walks and talks like a bunch of [truth-apt, belief-state] assertions it’s highly likely that it is a bunch of [truth-apt, belief-state] assertions”.

Semantic Non-Cognitivism

Semantic Non-Cognitivism might, given the plausibility of its cognitivist rival, seem to be an undesirable position. According to the semantic non-cognitivist when we utter sentences such as “murder is wrong” we are not attempting to describe any moral features of the world but we are simply expressing an attitude or feeling — perhaps disgust, or anger, in this case. Attitudes are not the types of things that can be true or false because they are not truth-apt; they do not aim at truth and do not attempt to describe or refer to any feature of the world. Consider what happens when you get frustrated with your work, for example, and exclaim “Ahhhhh!” This is an expression of an attitude, it is not something which describes the world and it is not truth apt. The semantic non-cognitivist thus argues that our moral utterances are more like “Ahhhhh!” than they are like “the defendant entered the courthouse”; they are non-descriptive, non-truth-apt expressions.

Psychological Non-Cognitivism

Psychological Non-Cognitivism is a view that is described by (though not defended by) Ralph Wedgwood (1964–). According to Wedgwood, psychological non-cognitivists hold that the psychology behind our non-truth-apt moral expressions is not to be understood as based on “belief”, but rather based on “…desires, preferences, emotions, intentions or the like”.

Your cry of “Ahhhhh!” in frustration does not express a belief that your work is annoying — even though people might take you to be annoyed — but, most likely, a desire or preference for your work to be over. Such mental states are fairly common and unremarkable; it is just that they are different to belief states.

When discussing Non-Cognitivism from this point, it should be understood as a position combining both the semantic and psychological elements. According to the non-cognitivist our moral utterances are not capable of being true or false and are expressions of attitudes/preferences/desires/emotions etc. rather than expressions of belief. Responding to a moral utterance by saying “true” or “false” would be to fail to properly comprehend the meaning of that moral statement just as it would be a mistake to respond to a cry of “Ahhhhh!” by saying “false”. The non-cognitivist thus suggests a fairly radical understanding of our common views regarding what moral utterances mean and how moral discourse works. Later, specific non-cognitivist views will be explained and evaluated and you can judge the desirability of this revision of our normal understanding for yourself.