6.8: Hispanoamérica 1970-2010
- Page ID
- 339984
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The last decades of the 20th century marked a progressive integration of Latin America into the "global era," and at the same time, a growing diversity in the history and cultural production of each country and region. From an era of dictatorships in the 1970s, the region gradually transitioned to a period of democratic governments that favored foreign investment, in what was called the "neoliberal era" or economic liberalization of the 1990s. These predominantly urban societies continue to face the challenge of ensuring that the majority of the population has access to employment, education, healthcare, and consumer goods. Cinema is one of the fields of cultural production with the widest international reach since the late 20th century, and it serves as a good indicator of sociocultural changes, especially since the 1960s. The film Señora de nadie (1982), for example, represents in Leonor, the main character, the growing participation of women in personal and social destinies, as well as the will—and difficulty—of the inhabitants of Latin America to build autonomous societies. At the same time, it symbolizes in Fernando, her husband, the difficulty in trusting governments that, like an unfaithful husband, frequently betray the interests of their own countries for the benefit of foreign investors. |
![]() Señora de nadie (1982), dirigida por María Luisa Bemberg (Argentina 1922-1995). |
The 1970s
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dueño: owner |
As we have seen, the global atmosphere of the Cold War from the 1960s to the 1980s fostered ideological polarization in Latin America and the world. For many leftists, the solution to poverty lay not in reforming capitalist institutions, but in replacing them with a socialist system of production leading to communism, in which all citizens would own the means of production. For many rightists, the only way to preserve institutions and businesses was by suppressing leftist movements through military repression. Both sides received support from their respective opposing world powers (the United States and the Soviet Union). Following the Latin Americanist movement and revolutionary fervor of the 1960s, Latin American ruling classes favored anti-socialist regimes, often through military dictatorships. By 1976, the military was in control of almost every Latin American country, some populist (Peru), others far-right (Chile). The only exceptions in Latin America during the 1970s were Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, the Dominican Republic, and Venezuela, with their limited democratic participation that catered to the expectations of Washington and the elite, controlling—often through heavy military repression—the activism of popular sectors under the “National Security Doctrine.” During those years, thousands of raids, threats, torture, disappearances, and massacres against dissidents were reported, many of whom went into exile (Argentine Adolfo Pérez Esquivel received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1980 for his activism against these abuses). On the other end of the spectrum, Cuba lost credibility as a “free territory of the Americas” because it was unable to eliminate its economic dependence on the Soviet Union. The Castro government also adopted a harder line against internal dissent, increasing the number of political prisoners and becoming increasingly dictatorial. Press censorship and anti-democratic measures thus became widespread in the region. In the most aggressive and best-funded dictatorships, such as those in Chile and Argentina, the political left was virtually dismantled. In Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua, which did not experience the industrial or urban development of other regions, the rural left-wing guerrilla movement continued to gain strength in the face of the deplorable conditions faced by the peasantry. In the economic sphere, the governments of the 1970s sought to control inflation—with the consequent and unpopular effective reduction of wages—and to favor the expansion of multinational corporations (IBM, Philips, Volkswagen, Bayer, ITT). In response to the lending willingness of North American and European entities such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), economic growth during these years depended largely on external debt. International banks relied on the massive deposits made by Middle Eastern magnates due to high oil prices and sought reliable clients in need of capital to provide loans at lucrative interest rates. Furthermore, within the context of the Cold War, it was important to finance the social control efforts of Latin American governments to prevent them from falling into the Soviet sphere of influence. Thus, Latin America increased its external debt during the 1970s from $27 billion to $231 billion. |
The 1980s
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Almost 80% of the Hispanic American population lives in cities, several of which are among the most populated in the world. |
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The 1990s and 2000s
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a medida que: as |
As global communism lost credibility and the Soviet Union dissolved, dictatorships were left without their main justification ("National Security") and without Washington's support. Furthermore, one of the neoliberal premises (and a condition of the IMF) was to attract foreign investment, which tends to favor constitutional stability. Civil protests by middle-class sectors in favor of human rights also exerted internal and external pressure toward democracy. Thus, almost all Latin American countries, except socialist Cuba, had presidents elected by direct vote in 1991, including governments as accustomed to dictatorship as Haiti and Paraguay. In the following years, almost all of these democracies strengthened and expanded, with ups and downs depending on the circumstances of each country. Three general categories can be identified. (1) On the one hand, there are the most open governments, with generally fair and free elections and acceptable respect for the rights of expression and civil organization, as in Costa Rica, Uruguay, and Chile. (2) At the other extreme, there are very restricted and unstable democracies, as in Suriname and Guatemala. (3) Between these two poles, most countries have partial democracies with more or less limited civil rights. Notable examples of presidents elected by popular vote who later acted as dictators are the regimes of Fujimori in Peru in the 1990s and Hugo Chávez in Venezuela in the 2000s. However, the trend in many democratically elected governments has been toward freer and fairer elections in which well-prepared civilian candidates, many from the middle class, participate. Political reforms have been made towards more participatory democracies, such as in the constituent assemblies of Colombia and Ecuador in the nineties, or in the electoral opening of Mexico, which for the first time "dethroned" the PRI in 2000, after seventy years of political monopoly. |
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partidos: political parties |
Another factor in this democratic expansion has been the resurgence of social activism, which has changed the power dynamics of political parties. Women's organizations, Afro-descendant groups, LGBTQ+ groups, human rights defenders, and many others have highlighted the region's sociocultural heterogeneity, challenging the notion that there is only one answer to popular needs (revolution, socialism). The most notable is the Indigenous movement, which, now separated from the political framework of the Marxist left and with the support of international organizations, has become a pressure group that the state cannot ignore in countries like Ecuador and Bolivia. Key moments for this force were the fall of President Jamil Mahuad in Quito in 1999 and the rise of President Evo Morales in La Paz in 2006. A comparable phenomenon, albeit with different strategies, is the Zapatista Movement in Chiapas, Mexico, which has had a significant influence on the power dynamics in that country since 1994. The Nobel organization recognized the global impact of Indigenous activism by awarding the Nobel Peace Prize in 1992 to Rigoberta Menchú-Tum, a Maya-Quiché activist from Guatemala. This increased national and international visibility of Indigenous and Afro-descendant peoples has led many intellectuals and activists to question the use of the adjective "Latino" to describe this part of the Americas. A barometer of the dynamism of popular movements has been the electoral strength of left-wing coalitions in almost every country, which have won the presidency in many of them—something Washington would not have allowed in previous decades. This trend of the first decade of the 21st century has been known as the “Pink Tide , ” because it represents a more moderate ideology than the “red” communism of the 20th century. The political tone differs in each case, but between 2000 and 2009 two lines can be identified: one similar to 20th-century populism with nationalist initiatives, authoritarian tactics, and acts of accelerated constitutional transformation (Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua), and another more centrist with policies that seek to maintain economic growth, favor private investment, and gradually improve wealth distribution (Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Jamaica, Haiti). Both trends favor trade integration between regions with comparable economies (Caricom, Mercosur), but are wary of free trade agreements between overly unequal economies (NAFTA, CAFTA). This shift to the left is related to the mixed results of the neoliberal reforms imposed by international banks. On the one hand, inflation was brought under control, and trade liberalization, which included strengthening free trade agreements and increasing foreign investment (Spain alone invested over one hundred billion dollars), produced respectable rates of economic growth: 3.5% on average for Latin America in the 1990s. On the other hand, unemployment did not decrease, social investment declined to cut government spending (less public access to health, education, and housing services, for example), the overall number of homeless people increased, and the gap between rich and poor widened. Latin America has continued to be the region with the worst wealth distribution in the world: in the 1990s, the richest 10% of households received 40% of the income. It is therefore understandable that many voters supported platforms that promised greater social equity. The Uruguayan writer Eduardo Galeano summarized this sentiment as follows:
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desempleo: unemployment |
Unemployment and rising poverty have also contributed to the increase in drug trafficking and emigration. Paradoxically, one of the cornerstones of Washington's post-Cold War policy toward the Americas has been responding to these two phenomena, which were unintentionally exacerbated by the very measures recommended by the "Washington Consensus." The "war on drugs" of the 1980s and 1990s gave the Pentagon a justification for maintaining some of its military investment in Latin America (which had been substantial during the Cold War). The 1989 invasion of Panama was justified in these terms. In the 2000s, however, the "war on terror" provided the military justification, so the trafficking of illegal substances ceased to be treated as a matter of war. But its increase along the Mexican border led to a renewed analysis of the issue from the perspective of U.S. security. Adding another dimension to the concept of “globalization,” the large number of Latin Americans who have emigrated—with or without visas—to the United States since the 1970s, and to Europe and Asia since the 1990s, is also changing the very concept of Latin America. The 2000 census revealed the surprising fact that the United States had almost 40 million Spanish speakers, surpassed only by Mexico, Colombia, and (possibly) Argentina. [1] To give just one economic example of their impact, the Inter-American Development Bank estimated that in 2006 these emigrants sent approximately US$62.3 billion from the United States to their home countries, a figure higher than the region's foreign investment that year (López-Córdova & Olmedo, p. 1). For some nations, this income is almost as significant as export revenue. Politically and culturally, this presence, which in the U.S. is associated with the term "Latinos," is equally transformative, as it alters the American electoral game and fosters a continental consciousness, no longer from treaties between governments, but from daily coexistence, which is not always harmonious. [1] Some of these 40 million did not immigrate, but are descended from those who lived in the Mexican territories that the United States annexed in the mid-19th century (Texas, California, New Mexico, etc.). |
Sources
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Chang-Rodríguez, Raquel and Malva Filer. Voices of Latin America . Boston: Thomson & Heinle, 2004.
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Craven, David. Art and Revolution in Latin America, 1910-1990. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002.
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Davies, Catherine, ed. The Companion to Hispanic Studies. Oxford University Press, 2002.
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Galeano, Eduardo. Notes for the End of the Millennium . Ecuador: El Conejo, 1979.
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López-Córdova, J. Ernesto and Alexandra Olmedo. “International migration, remittances and development: an overview”. Integration & Trade 27 (2007).
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Miller, Francesca. Latin American Women and the Search for Social Justice. University Press of New England, 1991.
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Oviedo, José Miguel. History of Spanish American Literature . Madrid: Alianza, 2001.
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Skidmore, Thomas E. and Peter H. Smith. Modern Latin America. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
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Winn, Peter. Americas: The Changing Face of Latin America and the Caribbean. 4th ed. Berkeley: U of California, 2005.




