5.6: Hispanic America 1970-2010
- Page ID
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The last decades of the 20th century mark a progressive integration of Latin America into the “global era”, and at the same time a growing diversity in the history and cultural production of each country and region. From an era of dictatorships in the 1970s, we gradually passed to a period of democratic governments that favored foreign investment, in what was called the “neo-liberal era” or economic openness in the 1990s. Mainly urban societies continue to face the challenge of allowing the majority of the population to have access to employment, education, health and consumption. Cinema has been one of the fields of cultural production with the greatest international diffusion since the end of the 20th century, and is a good indicator of sociocultural changes, especially since the 1960s. The film Señora de Nadie (1982), for example, represents in Leonor, the main character, the growing participation of women in personal and social destinies, as well as the will —and difficulty— of the inhabitants of Latin America to build autonomous societies. At the same time, it symbolizes in Fernando, her husband, the difficulty in believing in governments that, as an unfaithful husband, often betray the interests of their own countries for the benefit of foreign investors. |
![]() Señora de Nadie (1982), directed by María Luisa Bemberg (Argentina 1922-1995). |
The 1970s
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owner : owner |
As we saw, the global environment of the Cold War of the years 1960-80 fostered ideological polarization in Latin America and the world. For many leftists, the solution to poverty did not consist in reforming capitalist institutions, but in replacing them with the socialist system of production towards communism, in which all citizens would own the means of production. For many rightists, the only way to preserve institutions and companies was to stifle left-wing movements through military repression. Both received support from the respective opposing world powers (the United States and the Soviet Union). After Latin Americanism and the revolutionary enthusiasm of the 1960s, the Latin American ruling classes favored anti-socialist regimes, often through military dictatorships. By 1976, the army was in command of almost all Latin American countries, some of them populist (Peru), others of the extreme right (Chile). The only exceptions in Spanish America in the 1970s were Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, the Dominican Republic and Venezuela, with poorly participatory democracies that satisfied the expectations of Washington and the elite, controlling — often with strong military repression — the activism of the popular sectors under the “National Security Doctrine”. In those years, thousands of raids, threats, torture, disappearances and massacres were reported against dissidents, many of whom went into exile (Argentinian Adolfo Pérez Esquivel received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1980 for his activism against this type of abuse). On the other side of the spectrum, Cuba lost credibility as a “free territory of America” because it was unable to eliminate its economic dependence on the Soviet Union. The Castro government also took a harder line against internal dissent, increasing the number of political prisoners and becoming increasingly dictatorial. Press censorship and anti-democratic measures were thus widespread in the region. In the most aggressive and best-financed dictatorships, such as in Chile and Argentina, the political left was practically dismantled. In the case of Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua, which did not have the industrial or urban development of other regions, left-wing rural guerrillas continued to gain strength in the face of the deplorable conditions of the peasants. In the economic field, the governments of the 1970s sought to control inflation—with the consequent and anti-popular effective reduction in wages—and to favor the expansion of multinational corporations (IBM, Philips, Volkswagen, Bayer, ITT). In response to the lending of North American and European entities such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the economic growth of these years was largely dependent on external indebtedness. International banking relied on the million-dollar deposits made by Middle Eastern tycoons because of high oil prices, and was looking for reliable customers in need of capital to make loans at lucrative interest rates. In addition, within the Cold War, it was important to finance the social control efforts of Latin American governments to prevent them from falling into the Soviet sphere. Thus, Latin America increased its external debt in the 1970s from 27 thousand to 231 billion dollars. |
The 1980s
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Nearly 80% of the Spanish-American population lives in cities, several of which are among the most populated in the world. |
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The 1990s and 2000s
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As world communism lost credibility and the Soviet Union dissolved, dictatorships were left without their main justification (“National Security”) and without the support of Washington. In addition, one of the neo-liberal premises (and a condition of the IMF) was to attract foreign investment, which tends to prefer constitutional stability. Civilian protests by the middle sectors in favor of human rights also put internal and external pressure on democracy. Thus, almost all Latin American countries, except socialist Cuba, had presidents elected by direct vote in 1991, including governments as accustomed to dictatorship as Haiti and Paraguay. In the following years, almost all of these democracies were strengthened and expanded, with ups and downs depending on the circumstances of each country. Three general categories can be identified. (1) On the one hand, there are the most open governments, with generally fair free elections and acceptable respect for the rights of expression and civil organization, as in Costa Rica, Uruguay and Chile. (2) At the other extreme, there are very restricted and unstable democracies, as in Suriname and Guatemala. (3) Between these two poles, in most countries there are partial democracies with more or less limited civil rights. Notorious cases of presidents elected by popular vote who later acted as dictatorships are the Fujimori regimes in Peru in the nineties or Hugo Chávez in Venezuela in the 2000s. However, the trend of many democratically elected governments has been toward free and fairer elections in which well-prepared civilian candidates, many from the middle class, are running. Political reforms have been carried out towards more participatory democracies, as in the constituent assemblies of Colombia and Ecuador in the nineties, or in the electoral opening of Mexico, which for the first time “dethroned” the PRI in 2000, after seventy years of political monopoly. |
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parties: political parties |
Another factor in this democratic expansion has been the revival of social activism, which has changed the power dynamics of parties. Organizations of women, people of African descent, homosexuals, human rights defenders, among many others, have highlighted the socio-cultural heterogeneity of the region, disputing the idea that there is only one answer to popular needs (revolution, socialism). The most notable is the indigenous movement which, already separated from the political framework of the Marxist left and with the support of international organizations, in countries such as Ecuador and Bolivia is a pressure group impossible for the State to ignore. Key moments of this strength were the fall of President Jamil Mahuad in Quito in 1999 and the rise of President Evo Morales in La Paz in 2006. A comparable demonstration, although with different strategies, is the Zapatista Movement of Chiapas, in Mexico, which since 1994 had a significant influence on the dynamics of power in that country. The Nobel organization recognized the global impact of indigenous activism by awarding the Nobel Peace Prize to Guatemalan Maya-Quiché woman Rigoberta Menchú-Tum in 1992. This greater visibility, national and international, of indigenous and Afro-descendant peoples has led many intellectuals and activists to question the adjective “Latino” to refer to this part of America. A thermometer of the dynamism of popular movements has been the electoral strength of left-wing coalitions in almost all countries, which have come to the presidency in many of them, something that Washington would not have allowed in previous decades. This trend of the first decade of the 21st century has been known as “the Pink Tide”, because it represents a more moderate ideology than the “red” communism of the 20th century. The political tone is different in each case, but between 2000 and 2009, two lines can be identified: one similar to the populism of the 20th century with nationalist initiatives, authoritarian tactics and acts of accelerated constitutional transformation (Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua), and another more centrist with policies that seek to maintain economic growth, favor private investment and gradually improve the distribution of wealth (Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Jamaica, Haiti). Both trends favor trade integration between regions with comparable economies (Caricom, Mercosur), but they distrust free trade agreements between economies that are too unequal (NAFTA, CAFTA). This shift to the left is related to the mixed results of the neo-liberal reforms imposed by international banking. On the one hand, inflation was controlled and trade openness, which included a strengthening of free trade agreements and an increase in foreign investment (Spain alone invested more than one hundred billion dollars), produced respectable rates of economic growth: 3.5% on average for Latin America in the nineties. On the other hand, unemployment did not fall, social investment declined to cut government spending (less public access to health services, education and housing, for example), the overall number of indigent people increased, and the gap between rich and poor deepened. Latin America has continued to be the region with the worst distribution of wealth in the world: in the nineties, 10% of the richest households received 40% of their income. That's why it stands to reason that many voters supported platforms that promised greater social equity. Uruguayan writer Eduardo Galeano summarized this sentiment as follows:
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unemployment: unemployment |
Unemployment and the increase in poverty have also contributed to the increase in drug trafficking and emigration. Paradoxically, one of the axes of Washington's policy towards the Americas after the cold war has been to respond to these two phenomena, which were unintentionally aggravated by the measures recommended by the “Washington consensus” itself. The “war on drugs” of the eighties and nineties gave the Pentagon a reason to keep part of the military investment in Latin America (which had been in the millions during the Cold War). The invasion of Panama in 1989 was justified in these terms. In the 2000s, however, the “war on terror (ism)” sustained the military argument, so that trafficking in illegal substances stopped being treated as a war issue. But its increase on the Mexican border caused the issue to be reanalyzed from the point of view of security in the United States. Adding another dimension to the concept of “globalization”, the high number of Latin Americans who have emigrated —with or without a visa— to the United States since the 1970s, and to Europe and Asia since the nineties, is also changing the very concept of Latin America. The 2000 census revealed the surprising fact that the United States had nearly 40 million Spanish speakers, surpassed only by Mexico, Colombia and (possibly) Argentina. [1] Just to give an economic example of their impact, the Inter-American Development Bank calculated that in 2006 these emigrants sent nearly US$62.3 billion from the United States to their countries, a figure higher than that year's foreign investment in the region (López-Córdova & Olmedo, p.1). For some nations, this income is almost as significant as that of exports. Politically and culturally this presence, which in the U.S. The US is associated with the term “Latinos”, it is equally transformative, since it alters the American electoral game and promotes a continental conscience, no longer through treaties between governments, but through daily coexistence, which is not always harmonious. [1] A part of these 40 million did not immigrate, but are descended from those who lived in the Mexican territories that the United States annexed in the mid-19th century (Texas, California, New Mexico, etc.). |
Fuentes
- Chang-Rodriguez, Raquel and Malva Filer. Voices from Latin America. Boston: Thomson & Heinle, 2004.
- Craven, David. Art and Revolution in Latin America, 1910-1990. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002.
- Davies, Catherine, ed. The Companion to Hispanic Studies. Oxford University Press, 2002.
- Galeano, Eduardo. Notes for the end of the millennium. Ecuador: The Rabbit, 1979.
- Lopez-Cordova, J. Ernesto and Alexandra Olmedo. “International Migration, Remittances and Development: An Overview”. Integration & Trade 27 (2007).
- Miller, Francesca. Latin American Women and the Search for Social Justice. University Press of New England, 1991.
- Oviedo, Jose Miguel. History of Spanish-American literature. Madrid: Alliance, 2001.
- Skidmore, Thomas E. and Peter H. Smith. Modern Latin America. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Winn, Peter. Americas: The Changing Face of Latin America and the Caribbean. 4th ed. Berkeley: U of California, 2005.




